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HUMA4NITARIANISM, IDENTITY, AND NATION. MIGRATION
LAWS OF AUSTRALIA AND CANADA BY CATHERINE
DAUVERGNE (VANCOUVER: UBC PRESS, 2005) 256 pages.1
BY SASHA BAGLAY
2
In the popular discourse of refugee protection, many are likely
to agree with Michael Walzer that "perhaps every victim of
authoritarianism and bigotry is the moral comrade of a liberal citizen."
'3
In practice, however, being a moral comrade is not sufficient to gain
admission to, and membership in, a liberal state. In her insightful and
innovative book, Catherine Dauvergne skilfully exposes the ambivalent
nature of humanitarianism and its instrumental role in the creation of a
positive self-image for host nations. Her argument draws on an analysis
of migration laws in Australia and Canada with a specific focus on
refugee and other humanitarian admissions. While the subject is not
new, the author's approach to it is refreshingly untraditional. The book
explores the nature of migration laws using three analytical tools: law
and identity scholarship; liberal discourse as the predominant
framework for discussion of migration; and an understanding of the
nation as an imaginary entity rooted in myth and symbolism.4 In merging
the three, Dauvergne enriches legal method by weaving in perspectives
from other disciplines such as political science, sociology, and social
psychology. The book successfully builds on Dauvergne's previous
scholarship5 and represents a well-rounded and developed discussion of
the themes found in her journal publications. However, for all the
strengths, it lacks the dynamism of her admirable shorter pieces.
'[Humanitarianism, Identity, and Nation].
2 Adjunct Professor and Doctoral Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
The author wishes to thank her friend and colleague Martin Jones for commenting on an earlier
draft of this book review.
3 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1989) at 49.
'Supra note 1 at 56.
s Those familiar with Dauvergne's writing will find themes discussed in her previous
articles. See e.g. "The Dilemma of Rights Discourse for Refugees (2000) 23 U.N.S.W.L.J. 56;
"Beyond Justice: The Consequences of Liberalism for Immigration Law" (1997) 10 Can. J.L. & Jur.
323.
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The book's two-part structure separates the more general,
theoretical debate about identity, Nation, and migration from the
examination of the peculiarities of humanitarian admission in Australia
and Canada. Due to this combination of a theoretical analysis and a
practical discussion of substantive law, the book will appeal not only to
those interested in new approaches to theory, but also to students
seeking to learn the details of refugee determination in Australia and
Canada. Those looking for a highly sophisticated analysis of national
identity and its sociological construction will not, however, find it in the
book. Rather, correspondent to the purposes of the discussion, the
chapters of Part One provide an overview of the main approaches and
authorities on the issue, becoming a good starting point for further
reading.
While the insights of the book are numerous, I will focus only on
the two most salient: the discussion of humanitarianism in Part One and
the analysis of rights discourse in the jurisprudence of the High Court of
Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada in Part Two of the book.
Dauvergne's examination of humanitarianism is one of the most
remarkable aspects of this work. She manages to capture the essence of
this phenomenon that is so familiar in ordinary meaning of everyday
interpersonal relations, yet so tricky to define with regard to state
practice. Further, the author's attention to court jurisprudence
highlights the markedly different natures of rights discourse and
discourse on humanitarianism. The awareness of this distinction can
enrich our understanding of migration law and strategies to change it.
Part One sets the stage for analysis by describing the essence of
identity, Nation, and migration. It reviews various aspects of identity and
Nation as well as Nation's symbiotic relation with migration law and
explores liberalism and its limitations in evaluating migration decisions.
In this discussion, identity analysis is assigned a central role for a
number of reasons. In the author's opinion, identity is particularly well
suited for understanding migration law as it exposes the hierarchies,
categories, and gradations of community membership that lie at the core
of migration law and the rights available to individuals in a given
community. In an apt analogy, Dauvergne depicts rights as concentric
circles with citizenship at the centre: "[t]he closer one is to belonging to
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the nation, the more rights one has in the migration realm."6 This
pattern leaves non-citizens at the periphery where admission is granted
not as a matter of right, but as a matter of compassion (for refugees) or
economic expediency (for immigrants). By delineating the borders and
criteria of membership, migration law helps to constitute a community
and to inscribe its identity. As the author notes, migration law performs
the seemingly contradictory function of creating an impression of
stability while reflecting the perpetual changes in a nation's
understanding of itself.' In this process, the concept of the "other" is an
implicit but inalienable element as the identity of members is relational.
Put simply, it is defined in contrast with non-members. Thus, migration
law often resembles a "photographic negative" that highlights the
features which distinguish outsiders from insiders. The process of
"othering" fits squarely into the dominant liberal discourse of migration
and finds no challenge within it.
Drawing on works by Joseph Carens, Donald Galloway, and
Michael Walzer, the author concludes that liberalism cannot provide a
meaningful way of assessing fairness in migration policy and decision-
making. Unlike other realms of social life, where justice can be used as a
moral standard and an obligation to treat people in a particular way,
relations between members and non-members cannot be evaluated in a
similar fashion. Conceived to operate within the boundaries of a
community, liberalism can only generate standards that apply within
that community, thereby addressing issues of justice exclusively from the
perspective of society's members. Consequently, migration law that
regulates primarily outsiders and serves the interests of the host
community will always be immune from the challenges of justice. The
absence of a justice standard for immigration reinforces the importance
of other pragmatic solutions to strict membership control, one of which
is humanitarianism. The link between the latter and migration law is
rooted in the so-called "humanitarian consensus" among various schools
of liberal thought (advocates of open borders as well as supporters of
closed communities). This consensus prescribes that, under certain
circumstances, a nation should open its borders to people in need. The
6 Supra note 1 at 171.
7 Ibid. at 161.
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potential of humanitarianism to overcome the constraints on admission
of non-members has several aspects.
First, it contributes to the depiction of a nation as generous and
compassionate. Unlike the era post-World War II when refugees were
welcomed to Australia and Canada primarily as a source of labour for
growing economies, the current rationale for such admissions lies in the
realm of image-making for host nations. "[T]he value is not of the
refugees themselves, but of the nation for admitting them."8
Second, humanitarianism allows a nation to stay in control of
admission and to preserve the member versus non-member distinction.
Unlike justice, it is not an obligation, but rather a way to grant
somebody something to which they have no rightful claim.9 It is a largely
non-compellable political choice of rich nations that highlights the
inequality between the providers of humanitarianism and its
beneficiaries. Humanitarianism does not specify the exact circumstances
and number of people to be assisted, therefore allowing for fluctuations
in humanitarian admissions concomitant with public sentiment and
perceived national interests. Humanitarianism operates within the limits
of sovereignty, yet by appealing to the goodness of a nation, it allows the
manipulation of politics to respond to the plight of the needy. However,
the very pragmatic value of humanitarianism precludes it from
becoming a moral standard for refugee admission. The humanitarianism
of migration law is ambivalent as it lies at the point of tension between
the desire of a nation to be perceived as compassionate and a state's
sovereign demand to control its borders and population. The two
opposites are particularly difficult to reconcile given that migration law
remains, as Dauvergne argued in her previous work, the "last bastion of
state sovereignty."'" Humanitarianism achieves a balance only by
operating as the "exception to the rule." While respecting state
sovereignty, this approach does not provide the certainty necessary for a
moral standard. Instead, humanitarianism is doomed to be nothing
more than "an impoverished stand-in for justice."'"
8 Ibid. at 121.
9 Ibid. at 72.
"o See generally Catherine Dauvergne, "Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in'
Global Times" (2004) 67 Mod. L. Rev. 588.
" Supra note 1 at 7.
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However, for all the criticisms, the absence of a justice standard
for migration laws makes humanitarianism the only realistic challenge to
population and border control. 12 It mitigates the self-centredness of
migration law and injects into it an aspiration to be generous. 3 By
appealing to national identity, it portrays more open admission as
beneficial to state interests and makes it easier to advance such a policy.
The author in this respect echoes Will Kymlicka's suggestion that one of
the most effective ways to motivate people to act upon humanitarian
obligations is to appeal to national identity.'4
Having established the positioning of humanitarianism in
relation to law, identity, and liberal discourse, Dauvergne proceeds to an
examination of how it plays out in the specific contexts of the Australian
and Canadian nations based on immigration mythology. The author
creates images of respective national identities as a unity of three
characteristics: the construction of the "other" in domestic refugee laws;
the language of humanitarianism as applied to other admissions
(refugee-like situations, compassionate consideration) in day-to-day
administrative and judicial decision-making; and the analysis of rights
and humanitarian discourses in the jurisprudence of the highest courts
of the two countries.
The "othering" in refugee determination is one of the most vivid
characteristics of national identity as it symbolizes the encounter of the
nation with its "ultimate other"' 5-people who are the most unknown
and the most markedly different from members of the community.
Unlike economic and family migrants, who are admitted on the basis of
things that we know about them and that they share with us, refugees
are measured against the unknown, things that we cannot imagine. 6
This very construction, the emphasis on what refugees lack, triggers our
humanitarianism and serves as the passport to admission for refugees.'
In this process, however, the image of a nation maintains its centrality.
Being a mirror of a nation's beneficence, 8 humanitarianism draws




Will Kymlicka, "Being Canadian" (2003) Gov't & Opposition 357 at 359.
15 
Supra note 1 at 81.
16 Ibid. at 110.
17Ibid. at 126.
8
Ibid. at 4, 63.
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attention to a host nation, overshadowing the identity of those who
benefit from it. Their identity is relevant only as long as it conforms to
the idea that protection is conferred on deserving individuals-those
who are destitute, but with the potential to become good members of a
community." The link between the exercise of compassion and control
over membership becomes even more explicit in respect to non-refugee
humanitarian admissions. Drawing on the body of Australian executive
decisions and Canadian lower courts' jurisprudence of humanitarianism,
Dauvergne concludes that not only need, but also values of nuclear
family and economic success, are among the factors to be considered."z
The combination of the need and establishment criteria does not accord
well with common sense understanding of compassion and leads to the
development of "counterintuitive" interpretation of humanitarianism
that is particularly evident in the jurisprudence of Canadian lower
courts. The contradictions in the potential interpretation of the term
and its close connection to the interests of the nation-state once again
highlight the malleability of humanitarianism and its inability to provide
solid moral guidance for decision making.
Although, as established earlier, humanitarian claims are more
frequently based on an appeal to a nation's mercy, they can also be
framed as an assertion of rights. The link between humanitarianism and
rights discourse exists primarily through the case law in which
humanitarian claims are interpreted in rights-dominated settings.
Theoretically, the two fall within different ambits: rights discourse by
definition is rooted in justice and entitlement, while humanitarianism
entails inequality and a compassionate grant of something a beneficiary
has no right to. The core limitation to rights-based arguments is that a
rights-based claim triggers a rights-based response. Given that rights
exist in a hierarchical manner, a nation's prerogative to exclude
outsiders will usually trump other rights.2' On this basis, the author
concludes that the differences in migration-rights discourses in Australia
and Canada have little to do with the existence or absence of the
Charter of Rights,;2 they are rooted in differing perceptions of national
'9 Ibid. at 161.
20 Ibid. at 141, 163.
21 Ibi. at 212.
22 Ibid. at 168.
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identities. 3 Rather, the Charter of Rights creates an opportunity and
space for discourse on human rights. It is then up to the courts whether
to make use of this avenue or not.
Migration laws, and the place of humanitarianism within them,
tell us different stories about the two nations. Australia emerges as a
nation with vigilant territorial and population control and a strong hold
by the executive on humanitarian admissions. In contrast, Canada seems
to be less burdened with a culture of control. Humanitarian principles
are embodied in the law and have been fairly extensively developed by
the courts in a vast, and at times contradictory, jurisprudence. However,
as Dauvergne mentions, this does not make the Canadian system
better.24 In the absence of a justice standard for migration laws, national
rates and criteria of admission or institutional design of refugee
determination do not allow us to determine whether one system is
morally superior to the other. Instead, they allow us to infer conclusions
about a nation's character. For example, in Dauvergne's opinion,
Canadian culture emerges as accepting of refugees, more tolerant to
higher rates of immigration, and more committed to multiculturalism.25
Such statements make me uneasy.
While the author provides extensive evidence regarding judicial
interpretation of the nation's identity, little is said about the broader
societal and historical context that can allow reaching meaningful
conclusions on the essence of Canadian culture. Dauvergne's "strategic
sampling" 6 cannot create an adequate and objective portrait of
Canada's treatment of refugees without mentioning the anti-refugee
debate following arrival of the Sikh boat people in 1987; the mass
detention of the Chinese boat people who arrived in British Columbia in
the late 1990s; or the national electoral campaigns of the Reform Party.
Furthermore, while generally acknowledging the link between
geographic differences and cultures of control in the two jurisdictions, 7
Dauvergne does not pay much attention to the factors that historically
contributed to the development of each nation's identity. Most notably,
23 Ibid.
2
4 Ibid. at 123.
25 Ibid. at 123-24.
26 Ibid. at 9.
2 7 Ibid at 159.
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the core question remains untouched: why have the similarly situated
Australian and Canadian societies developed such different levels of
tolerance towards asylum seekers? Perhaps this question will be a
project for another book.
Ultimately, the book is a stimulating and informative read. It is
also disturbing (and therein lies one of its strengths), as it challenges the
pride of Canadians and Australians at being world-leaders in
humanitarianism. It mercilessly exposes the narcissistic and self-serving
nature of humanitarianism and the resilience of state sovereignty in the
face of globalization. Dauvergne is even pessimistic in suggesting that in
the future humanitarian admission will be increasingly singled out from
general migration as an exception to the rule serving national interests."
Yet, the alarming content is a source of hope insofar as it can serve as a
call to action. It is time to stop applauding ourselves and to recognize
the true motivations behind state practices. Furthermore, the awareness
of identity discourse and of the pragmatic values of humanitarianism
can help pave the way to more open admission policies inscribed as
inalienable features of host nations' identities.
28 Ibid. at 76.
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